Short UNXL. As Unipixel plunges, MDB Capital pulls research

January 25, 2013 | RP

In the space of 10 weeks shares of Unipixel (UNXL) more than tripled from $6.00 in November to a high of $19.67 in January. Trading volume increased as much as 100 fold from just $200,000 per day to over $20 million per day. The catalyst for this upward move was a press release which came out on December 7th and an outpouring of bullish opinions from SeekingAlpha authors. The predictions from the authors have consistently stated that the company is a 10-20 bagger and will quickly become a “multi-billion dollar company”.

Since that time, the share price has quickly fallen back to $13.80, a decline of 30% from the recent high of two weeks ago. The shares have now declined in each of the past five trading days on substantial volume of around $12 million per day.

MDB pulls its research and Unipixel begins to plunge

Two things are contributing to the continuous drop. First, two short biased articles came out questioning Unipixel’s technology. Second, immediately after the short articles, MDB Capital removed all of its research reports from its website with no announcement or explanation. These pages had all been available to any reader up until two weeks ago when they were suddenly removed. MDB had also eliminated all reference to a number of former case studies which highlighted 10 bagger stocks which have since imploded to pennies on the pink sheets.

Many investors who have become extraordinarily bullish on Unipixel are likely not aware that MDB takes large equity stakes in the low float stocks that it covers (including Unipixel) and then employs unregistered analysts in Nicaragua to write bullish reports on these stocks. MDB then reserves the right to sell these shares as a principal, and even take short positions.

MDB stocks have demonstrated a persistent pattern of surging (sometimes by several hundred percent) following MDB’s involvement and a flurry of optimistic but vague press releases. The low float of these stocks contributes to the exceptionally sharp rises that can be seen even with the slightest amount of positive news. Yet MDB’s deals also have shown a persistent pattern of imploding thereafter, at which time MDB ceases research coverage. By that time MDB has presumably exited the stock.

The fact that MDB has now pulled all of its research from its website may be a reason for near term concern.

A number of bullish authors have consistently cited the research of MDB Capital in arriving at their billion dollar and 20 bagger conclusions. However these authors and experienced investors failed to mention the key disclosures contained within MDB’s research. The disclosures made by MDB are all so unusual in the world of finance that it is quite odd that the authors failed to highlight them when putting out their tremendous forecasts.

Because these reports have been removed by MDB, I used a web service to retrieve the contents. contains a feature called “The Wayback Machine” which trolls through billions of web pages every day and then archives them for future reference. As a result, we can still see most of the data and disclosure which has been removed by MDB.

I will use disclosures from Unipixel as the most relevant example, however I encourage readers to view the other MDB reports using the Wayback Machine to see the consistency of this disclosure.

I have also found historical MDB presentations which have been archived elsewhere. These presentations contain case studies which show the spectacular results of MDB’s promotional research with examples of 10 bagger stocks. However, the case studies have now been discontinued by MDB (along with the research) due to the implosion of the companies after MDB’s involvement.

MDB deals: sharp spikes on vague news, but then the plunge

It has been a consistent theme that MDB obtains an equity stake (including free warrants) in a very low float stock right before initiating coverage on the stock. MDB then bestows its “MDB Best And Brightest Award” and “MDB ASTRUM Award” upon its new investment. As with Unipixel, a series of vague but promising press releases come out from the company and the stock price soars dramatically. MDB then disappears for a period of time and then the stock plunges back to pre-MDB levels. At some time later, MDB comes back and issues a “re-initiation report” just in time for the company to raise money. Then the whole process begins again.

It is certainly notable that whenever MDB puts out new bullish research on its latest “billion dollar” reverse merger, the firm seems to benefit from an outpouring ofindependent analysis from ultra bullish authors in various online locations. Examples from past MDB deals will be highlighted extensively below.

What about Craig Hallum ?

It is notable that MDB companies seem to frequently appear in Craig Hallum conferences, research calls and equity financings and seem to always get very bullish attention and price targets from Craig Hallum. Craig Hallum’s involvement will also be highlighted in the examples that follow.

Unipixel – a recap and a starting point

MDB first became involved with Unipixel in 2010, but then disappeared as the stock price plunged. According to an MDB case study:

“the company was pre-revenue with 2 months cash and 3.1 million in convertible notes maturing in 2 months”. MDB’s stated activities included:

  • Lifted company from OTC.BB to NASDAQ Capital Markets
  • Executed financing to raise $17.25MM including over allotment
  • Actively covering with research coverage and introducing to investors post financing.

In 2010 MDB also presented Unipixel with the ASTRUM award and MDB’s “PatentVest” determined that Unipixel was “ranked in the 90th percentile for technology leadership from over 1,600 small cap companies”.

When MDB first became involved, the stock was trading at just over $3.00. Withinweeks it had nearly tripled, closing as high as $8.40 and within a year it was trading above $9.00. Then it proceeded to fall.

Following that, MDB seems to have lost interest for a considerable period of time with little or no further activity or interest from MDB.

But in 2012, when the share price was back down to around $5.00, MDB issued a “re-initiation report”, just in time for Unipixel to complete another equity offering viaCraig Hallum. The “re-initiation report” has now been removed by MDB, but a link to it using the Wayback Machine can be found here.

The disclosure regarding the unregistered analysts in Nicaragua and the right to take future short positions can be found on page 7. Earlier in the report we can see mentions of such giants as Apple Computer (AAPL) and Samsung.

It is now 8 months later. And now, once again, the share price more than tripledfollowing a “rediscovery” of the tremendous upside potential which has suddenly reappeared now that MDB is again involved in the stock. During that time the only positive news was a single press release in December which provided minimal detail.

This situation is in no way unique to Unipixel. Numerous examples will clearly demonstrate this persistent pattern in MDB deals over time.

I have deliberately given numerous examples and extensive detail which makes this article quite long. The examples all make the same basic point. Some readers may feel satisfied after reading just a few. Those readers can feel free to skip to the conclusion at their own option.

Microvision – Déjà vu for Unipixel investors ?

Summary: After MDB gets involved, bullish independent authors seize upon several vague technology press releases and stock goes to near $50.00. Stock then implodes to below $2.00. But by this time MDB is long gone.

A few years ago MDB became involved with Microvision Inc (MVIS) which develops high-resolution mini laser display and imaging engines. According to an MDB case study, Microvision had 1 month left in cash on was swamped in near term debt. Its situation was therefore very similar to Unipixel prior to MDB. MDB helped Microvision raise $33 million to pay down debt and maintain operations. More importantly, MDB states that it “devised approach to reposition the perception of the company with investors”. The approach devised by MDB clearly worked quite well.

Shortly after MDB became involved the company benefited from an outpouring ofdetailed technology analysis on SeekingAlpha, similar to what we have recently seen on Unipixel. Shlomi Cohen began by describing its “serious potential” which he bases on a newly issued “Buy” recommendation from MDB Capital as well as the attention that Microvision would get at an upcoming CES conference in Las Vegas. The stock had blockbuster potential “since the company is already fielding inquiries from leading handset manufacturers”. As with Unipixel, the names of the manufacturers were not given. Is this starting to sound familiar ? It gets better.

When the share price was below $2.00, Craig Hallum then put a $6.00 share price target on the stock in a “Buy recommendation“, clearly sharing MDB’s optimism.

Just like Unipixel, various SeekingAlpha authors suddenly discovered this hidden gem and began to publish detailed analysis of Microvision’s product and the industry. Just like Unipixel, Microvision had multi-bagger potential because it had devised a better technology and because it was clearly about to begin competing head to head with multibillion dollar industry giants such as Corning (GLW) and 3M (MMM).

Microvision continued to announce partnerships with undisclosed global players. Although the names of the partners were not disclosed, these diligent independent authors were able to deduce with 100% certainty that it must be Sony Ericsson. With Unipixel investors have now concluded it will be Dell Computer (DELL).

All of this hype caused Microvision to quadruple over the space of less than a year, reaching almost $50.00 (as adjusted for its recent 1:8 reverse split) despite very limited and vague disclosure and no actual commercial progress. The stock later subsequently traded down to around $7.00 (down 85%) as time wore on and revenues did not materialize as planned and as the partner was not disclosed.

At that time, a second round of press releases from Microvison again pushed the stock up from $7.00 to near $50.00 – a quick 7 bagger. In the wave two push, thepress releases included very specific “multi-million” dollar contracts with specific parties such as the US government, Corning, and Lockheed.

Eventually it became clear that these were one time contracts to purchase prototypes and other non-commercial applications. As a result, the allure of the headline value quickly faded. Despite all of the hype and the absolute certainty of many bullish authors, as based on the compelling press releases from Microvision, the stock has now fallen from near $50.00 to just $1.90. Despite the many press releases announcing millions in potential business, Microvision has had nothing butcumulative losses which now exceed $150 million.

Now that the stock has fallen from near $50.00 to below $2.00, MDB no longer provides research updates on the company.

Crossroads Systems – multi-million dollar partnerships, multi-bagger potential

Summary: After MDB’s involvement, shares quadruple based on news of major global partnerships and disruptive technology. MDB disappears, but then “re-initiates” when stock falls back down to $2.00 with new opportunities.

In 2010, Crossroads was a pink sheet company trading at around $0.20-$0.50 per share. Relative to Unipixel, the opportunity with Crossroads could be described as even more compelling. Comparable companies in the exploding high tech field of data storage, such as Iron Mountain (IRM) and EMC (EMC), command market caps of anywhere from $5 billion to $50 billion. Crossroads currently has a market cap of just $20 million.

MDB became involved to help Crossroads raise up to $10 million in new financing in 2010. Within a 6 week period, the share price tripled from $1.60 to $4.80, hitting its peak right as MDB closed the $10 million financing for Crossroads. MDB received $750,000 in cash along with 1.3 million warrants on Crossroads Stock.

MDB notes that its services to Crossroads as included “actively covering with research coverage and introducing to investors post financing”.

In 2011 (after MDB was long the stock) the excitement began to build with a stream of new press releases from Crossroads including:

  • partnership with European consulting megagiant Capgemeni (terms not disclosed)
  • MDB Capital placed Crossroads on their “Best and Brightest List”. Crossroads had also received the “ASTRUM Award” from MDB.
  • presentations at conferences held by MDB Capital, the Craig Hallum Alpha Select Conference and Las Vegas industry events.
  • a new board appointment, who had previously worked at Fidelity
  • a strategic agreement with IBM (terms not disclosed)
  • Crossroads reverse split their stock and uplisted to the Nasdaq

All of these exciting developments did not go unnoticed and Crossroads stock quickly rose to $7.60, roughly a quadruple of where it had been before MDB got involved.

Similar to Microvision and Unipixel, once the stock peaked out, MDB seems to have lost interest and disappeared for a period of time as the stock started falling sharply. However in June 2012, MDB came back, issuing a “re-initiation report“. Once again, this Crossroads report can no longer be viewed on the MDB web site, so the link I included is from the Wayback Machine at

The net result of the promising partnerships with the global giants such as IBM and CapGemeni has been $18 million of losses without ever turning a single annual profit. Rather than taking off as expected, revenues have been declining further.

Similar to Microvision, Crossroads bottomed out, trading down from over $6.00 in 2012 to around $2.00 (on minimal volume) at present. But as with Microvision and Unipixel, Crossroads is now attempting wave two, so the press releases and partnerships have now (by necessity) become far more specific. In August 2012, shortly after MDB “re-initiated” coverage, Crossroads “signed a $5 million deal” with industry mega giant Iron Mountain . However, also similar to Microvision, the deal ended up being a non-recurring one-time event. $3 million of the “deal” was actually an investment by Iron Mountain, and so does not even count as revenue.

For investors who bought into the 18 months of hype and press releases the results have been quite the opposite of what was expected. MDB’s involvement coincided with a run up in the stock to as high as $7.60. The shares now trade at just over$2.00, right in line with where they were prior to MDB’s involvement.

What does this have to do with Unipixel ?

At this point in time, readers may benefit from going back to the Unipixel press release from December 7th, 2012. Hopefully readers will notice a number of key omissions. The press release:

  • Does not say who the PC maker is
  • Does not disclose the amount of the agreement
  • Does not say over how many years the revenues are to be realized
  • Does not say if the revenues will be recurring or if this is a one-time agreement
  • Does not say if the products provided will be used commercially, or just for marketing, research or prototypes

As with other MDB clients, the presumed reason for the non-disclosure is to protect “competitive secrets”. But if we don’t know who the partner is, then it should have been safe to disclose the dollar amounts. And if neither of those items is disclosed then certainly we should be able to know if the products will be used commercially as opposed to simply being used for one time R&D, prototypes or marketing purposes.

Knowing more detail is clearly very material in making an investment decision. If this were a $9 million commercial contract to be realized during 2013 alone, then this could be a very meaningful event for Unipixel. However if it is a non-recurring $2 million contract to be realized over 5 years then the effect is basically immaterial. Right now a number of very bullish authors are simply using their imaginations and envisioning the best possible scenario. This was the same optimism that was expressed by authors (and investors) who drove up the prices of Crossroads and Microvision by several hundred percent before they ultimately plunged.

Has MDB research ever produced a “billion dollar company” ?

MDB has repeatedly laid claim to the successes of two stocks, Medivation (MDVN) and VirtnetX (VHC), both of which have grown from tiny companies into companies worth more than $1 billion. MDB does not make the “billion dollar” dollar claim with any other companies. But the question becomes: just how did MDB contribute to the billion dollar status of these two companies ?

In both cases MDB’s role was to provide an empty shell to these companies so that they could complete a reverse merger and raise funds. MDB bought an empty shell and then provided it to the companies, while retaining partial ownership for itself. The point is that MDB never even covered the companies with research but states that it launched these companies into the public markets. So MDB sold them a shell.

Now that these companies have gone on to become billion dollar companies, MDB has suggested that their success should for some reason to be extrapolated to other companies which MDB covers on the research side.

ClearSign – another 20 bagger and billion dollar company

Summary: After several bullish media plugs describing it as a “billion dollar company”, low float ClearSign surges, only to plunge afterwards and become illiquid.

A recent blog post from Gene Marcial seems to see things quite differently in terms of MDB’s involvement with VirtnetX and Medivation. Mr. Marcial was formerly a journalist for Business Week, where he noted his column “was one of the most influential market columns as it moved the stocks I highlighted each week”.

Mr. Marcial is no longer a journalist at Business Week. Now, as a “contributor” to a simple blog at, Mr. Marcial has prominently highlighted MDB’s ability to find “not just stock winners but great super-stock achievers”.

Mr. Marcial highlights the involvement of MDB with Medivation and VirtnetX. For some reason he fails to notice that neither of these companies were even covered by MDB research. For some reason MDB’s stock picking is also mentioned alongside both Apple and Google. This entire theme then segues into an incrediblyvaluable plug for MDB’s latest stock pick on the research side, ClearSign Combustion (CLIR).

ClearSign seemed an odd pick for a former journalist to highlight in his blog at Forbes, especially alongside a group of mega cap super performers. The tiny, illiquid ClearSign was trading just 1,000 shares per day and had a market cap of just $40 million. As might be expected, the sudden high profile attention caused the stock to take off. ClearSign rose nearly 30% in three days on over 1,000 times the previous volume. The stock quickly reached an all time high of $7.55. The stock has now fallen back to $4.90, well below where it was at the time of Mr. Marcial’s plug. Volume has fallen to just 10,000 shares per day.

The parallels to Unipixel should be clear. In describing ClearSign, Marcial quoted MDB as saying:

We think it has the potential to be as big or bigger than Medivation or VirnetX because its technology platform effectively addresses a market that is probably 20 times larger than those of Medivation or VirnetX…The technology is so game changing that the margins could equal pharmaceutical or software margins…We expect the combustion industry will soon be lining up to partner with ClearSignand its valuation will be on its way to a multi-billion dollar level

It wasn’t the first plug for a tiny MDB reverse merger. While Marcial was with Business Week, the publication delivered a similar plug for MDB regarding the now-imploded Microvision. SeekingAlpha followers were quick to note that plug, in an article entitled “The Business Week Effect: Watch for Microvision’s High Open Tuesday” The exciting catalyst for a surge in Microvison was described in Business Week as:

The market for the laser-based displays in micro form is huge, as the cell-phone market is still basically untapped,” he says. Joel Achramowicz, an analyst at MDB Capital, rates the stock a buy and expects Microvision to partner with a handset maker by summer.

As with ClearSign, Microvision did experience the “Business Week Effect” and rose sharply as expected. As we know, Microvision has fallen to below $2.00 after trading near $50.00 in the past. Mr. Marcial also included an interesting development. The former CEO from MDB’s now imploded Microvison has now beeninstalled as the CEO at MDB’s new hot pick ClearSign.

As with Unipixel, ClearSign has now become a hot topic for debate on SeekingAlpha. Again, the parallels with Unipixel should be clear. The most recent article (November 2012) comes from an author who describes ClearSign with:

This is one of the most exciting investment opportunities I’ve ever been a part of, since the Company’s technology has the potential to massively disrupt the existing economic model and environmental impacts of combustion systems. ClearSign is a development-stage company – there are no revenues yet – and with that carries substantial risk. But if things continue on the current trajectory, this could very well be a billion-dollar company.

We can see from their posting history that four of the recent Unipixel authors had never written about a single other stock prior to their flurry of articles and comments on Unipixel. As with the Unipixel authors, it is noteworthy that this author had never felt the urge to write about any other stock ever, even though he states that

I’ve been involved in founding, building and investing in early-stage technology companies since the mid 1990s

It is equally noteworthy that when this experienced technology investor finally chose to break his 20 years of silence with his first article, he discloses long positions in three stocks which are currently being promoted by MDB research. The three stocks are ZBB Energy (ZBB), ClearSign and Parametric Sound (PAMT).

MDB issued bullish reports on all of them in 2012 which were still readable two weeks ago. Unfortunately, as with Unipixel, the links to these reports were recently removed so they can no longer be viewed. I have included the reports which have been captured by The Wayback Machine as an appendix to this article.

MDB case studies – the past and the present

A review of continued and discontinued case studies from MDB is revealing.

I am quite deliberately not “cherry picking” case studies in order to make a certain point. I have deliberately addressed each and every case studyincluded by MDB from its archived presentation as well as on its current web page.

A discontinued MDB case study – Idera Pharmaceuticals

In a presentation from 2010, MDB included Idera Pharmaceuticals (IDRA) as a successful case study. In its current case study page MDB no longer includes this company for very obvious reasons. As shown in the link, this presentation was archived in a third party site.

In 2007 MDB initiated Idera with a Buy recommendation. The MDB case study (which MDB no longer uses) notes that MDB:

Elucidated why IDRA was superior to competing technologies and communicated investment thesis to sophisticated institutional investors that resulted in a 3x increase in market value within 15 months

Key elements of the pitch included details of MDB’s “intense due diligence” along with the fact that “the competition has failed while Idera evolved as the leader inking 3 successful big Pharma partnerships with Merck, Novartis and Merck KGA:.

As with Unipixel, the partnerships with established global giants drove the share price sharply higher. Within 12 months, Idera was trading at over $15.00. At the time of the MDB case study the stock was already down to $5.00. The stock currently trades at $0.69.

MDB no longer provides research updates on Idera and no longer cites Idera in its case studies .

Another discontinued MDB case study – Maxygen Inc.

In the same presentation, MDB also cites Maxygen (MAXY) as yet another MDB success. When the share price was $8.19 MDB initiated Maxygen as a Buy with a $15.00 share price target. Like Unipixel, small cap Maxygen apparently had some special IP that put it on par with a mega cap global giant. For Maxygen, the comparable was $30 billion Amgen.

The case study tells us that “IP analysis involved an extensive review of the patent landscape of MAXY-G34 versus Neulasta (by Amgen)”. It goes on to state that “Our review of the IP revealed that MAXY’s optimized G-CSF is distinct from Amgen’s Neulasta at several sites in the amino acid sequence and has novel PEGylation sites that are outside of Amgen’s patents”.

Now that Maxygen trades at just $2.44, MDB no longer covers the company with research and Maxygen is no longer included in MDB case studies..

Yet another discontinued case study – Allos Therapeutics

MDB’s presentation clearly states in big bold letters that:

subsequent to our research, institutional investors, including Warburg Pincus and Baker Brothers took large positions. ALTH increased in market cap from $65M to almost $700M

At the time of the presentation shares of Allos shares of Allos were trading above $8.00, making it a temporary ten bagger for MDB.

In 2012 the stock fell as low as $1.25 and MDB no longer covered the stock from the research side and no longer included it in its successful case studies. Allos was later bought out for $1.82.

MDB case study: Lipid Sciences – how low can you go ?

In its case study on Lipid Sciences (LIPD), MDB notes that it:

  • Raised in excess of $80MM in private placements and merger financing.
  • Took company from inception to over $200MM in market value in 18 months.

Lipid Sciences does still occasionally trade, but on the pink sheets for less than one penny.

MDB no longer covers the company with research.

MDB case study: Hollis Eden – you can still go lower

From the MDB case study we can see the following in regards to Hollis Eden (HRBR):

What MDB Delivered:

  • Positioned company with a powerful platform technology capable of multiple uses
  • Arranged seed capital
  • Recruited board and directors and key management to assist in execution of strategy
  • Sourced public company and executive merger and financings aggregating approximately $50MM
  • Market value of shares reached approximately $200MM in 18 months from when we started and over $800MM peak market value.

(Note: the MDB case study still lists the ticker for Hollis Eden as HEPH. The ticker was subsequently changed to HRBR after the termination of the CEO for cause.)

Hollis Eden at one time reached a share price of $30.00, but now trades for just $0.12 (that is twelve cents). In addition, these numbers need to be adjusted for a 1:1000 reverse split.

One obvious problem was that the CEO had to be fired for cause. Although the company did not issue a news release, it was noted that:

The possible offenses include misappropriation of funds, fraud, engaging in an activity that is harmful to the company or conviction of a crime, according to the contract

After the termination, Hollis Eden changed its name to Harbor Biosciences.

Following the termination, MDB continued to list Hollis Edenamong its Best and Brightest conference attendees. Accordingto MDB’s press release (which includes Hollis Eden):

Bright Lights Conference Will Showcase 50 of the Most Innovative U.S. Small Cap Companies with Disruptive Intellectual Property in San Francisco on May 10 – 12, 2010

Hollis Eden (aka Harbor Biosciences) is no longer listed among MDB’s “Best and Brightest” and MDB no longer provides research coverage on the stock.

Are there more case studies from MDB ?

No. I have deliberately addressed every company which is featured as an MDB case study as is shown on their current web page and as is shown in the archived presentations.

Conclusion – a few questions investors should ask themselves

Many bullish investors will no doubt continue to ask what does any of this have to do with Unipixel or its billion dollar technology.

These investors (and authors) will point out that Unipixel is somehow different simply because they have performed such extensive and specific analysis on Unipixel’s described technology. I have quite deliberately refrained from making any evaluation of Unipixel’s technology.

In the past many investors have taken the brief and vague press releases issued by numerous MDB clients and repeatedly extrapolated billion dollar market caps and 20 bagger stocks. They have based their predictions on analysis that is every bit as rigorous as that which has been recently published on Unipixel. However, as with Unipixel, the underlying information (press releases) on which they based their analysis was often very vague and open to a wide range of interpretations. As with Unipixel, these investors (and authors) presented in writing the most spectacular conceivable outcomes based on a tiny shred of incomplete information.

In November 2012, shares of Unipixel were trading at around $6.00-$7.00 on average volume of just 50,000 shares per day. Starting two days before the December 7th press release this began to change. The volume more thanquadrupled and the share price reached a high of $8.50. It seems clear that this material information was not a well kept secret. Following the press release the low float stock then surged to over $15.00 on substantial volume, a double from the previous week.

Investors should take the time to re-read the press release and ask what does it actually say vs. what it is just heavily implying. Investors should ask themselves why Unipixel could not give any more information that what it has provided. Competitive secrets could still be maintained by any company even while giving investors substantially more information upon which to make an investment decision.

Investors should then ask themselves why the experienced investors who are calling this stock a near term 20 bagger failed to make any mention of the disclosures from MDB Capital. These disclosures include ownership of a large stake (including free warrants) in Unipixel by MDB, use of unregistered analysts in Nicaragua to write bullish reports and the right to sell as a principal as well as to go short Unipixel. The authors writing these articles have made heavy reference to the MDB reports such that simply not seeing this disclosure would seem highly unlikely. These authors have made repeated mention of various discussions with MDB bankers, but never mentioned the notable history of stock implosions and discontinued research following MDB’s involvement.

And now the research reports from MDB have all been pulled from MDB’s web site just as the stock begins to plunge on very heavy volume every single day. The information was made fully available as the stock was rising such that it could be widely cited by bullish authors. But now it is gone.

References to MDB’s historical case studies which touted numerous high fliers (gains of up to 1,000%) have also been removed, but only after these stocks imploded to as low as the pennies.

Investors should ask themselves why has all of this information been removed without explanation ? And why has this sudden removal coincided with a steady drop in the share price of more than 30% on heavy daily volume ?

For those who feel they have an answer, I always welcome any feedback.

Appendix I – archived copies of the pulled MDB reports

Once again, it is not my intention to “cherry pick” any information regarding MDB.

As a result, I have taken the time to look up every single research report that has been pulled from MDB’s web site and post the appropriate link from The Wayback Machine located at Not all of the reports were captured by The Wayback Machine, however I have posted all of the ones that were captured. Readers should feel free to test any and all links from MDB’s web page using The Wayback Machine.

The links are listed below.

Please note: As of this writing many investors have already become aware that these reports have been removed from MDB’s web page. The links which used to lead to these reports have now been re-directed to a general information page about MDB instead. MDB has the ability to re-connect these links at any time such that they reports can become available immediately at MDB’s option.

ClearSign “re-initiation” report September 2012

Parametric Sound report August 2012

Crossroads Systems report August 2012

Crossroads Systems report July 2012

Crossroads Systems initiation report June 2012

Unipixel report May 2012

Unipixel “re-initiation” report April 2012

Imageware Systems report June 2012

Imageware Systems initiation report June 2012

Disclosure: I am short UNXL. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.